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LIMITS OF ETHNIC SOLIDARITY IN THE ENCLAVE ECONOMY* JIMY M. SANDERS VICTOR NEE University of South Carolina Cornell University
Contemporary research on the social and economic adaptation of immigrants to life in the United States emphasizes the salience of ethnic solidarity. Portes and others advance the "enclave-economy hypothesis" that immigrants in an enclave-labor market receive earning-returns to human capital commensurate with the earning-returns of immigrants in the primary labor market. This position contradicts the classical assimilation view that segregation retards the economic achievement of minorities.
However, our analysis of earnings among Cuban and Chinese immigrants suggests that the enclave-economy hypothesis is only partially correct. The hypothesis is supported in the case of entrepreneurs, but the assimilation perspective better explains the earnings of employees. We suggest a reformulation of the enclave-economy hypothesis that is sensitive to important differences between immigrant-workers and immigrant-bosses.
In the early part of this century, scholars sought to identify recurrent patterns in the processes through which waves of diverse European immigrant groups settled into U.S. society (e.g., Handlin 1951) . The view that there exists a universalistic process of adaptation extends to non-Europeans such as Asian immigrants to the west coast (Park and Burgess 1921) . There have always been alternative and less universalistic interpretations (e.g., Bogardus 1930) , but the broadly formulated position of Park and Burgess (1921) and Park (1926) is the most enduring sociological view of immigrant-adaptation. The four-part immigrant-adaptation/race-relations cycle of "contacts, competition, accommodation, and eventual assimilation" was viewed by Park (1926, p. 196 , emphasis added) as a natural history of intergroup contact. This model assumed an evolutionary perspective, though the process of assimilation varied considerably in timing for different groups, depending on their initial characteristics and on historical conditions shaping the response of the host society (see Hirschman 1983 ).
In Park and Burgess' view, assimilation was driven by social-psychological processes.
Changes in social-structural relations (e.g., a decline in occupational discrimination) that open new avenues of immigrant-adaptation stem from intergroup mixing and the sharing of experiences. These developments are inevitable once intergroup contact is established. Conflict will probably precede the emergence of cooperative social arrangements, but, as groups come to share common definitions of various situations, the social-structural barriers between them are undermined. The ecological hypothesis of an inverse relationship between segregation and socioeconomic achievement among minority groups follows from this argument.
OVERCOMING THE COSTS OF SEGREGATION?
Sociological study of the processes through which immigrants adapt to their new country is undergoing a marked revival. ' Segmented-labormarket and ethnic-solidarity theories have emerged as the most influential in current studies of immigrant-incorporation. The segmented-labor-market perspective extends "dual economy" theory (Averitt 1968; Galbraith 1971) to the organization of labor markets. According to this view, the labor force in advanced capitalism is segmented into two or more labor markets (Gordon 1972; Edwards 1975) . The primary labor market, because it is characterized by stable work conditions, higher wages, scarce skill specifications, and internal labor markets that provide ladders of success within the firm, provides higher returns on human capital investments for workers. By contrast, the secondary labor market is typically characterized by high turnover rates, low-paying, lowskill jobs that lack structured opportunities for promotion within the firm; it generates low returns on human capital investments. Segmented-labor-market theory posits that the dynamics of labor market incorporation in advanced capitalism result in the disproportionate concentration of racial minorities and women into the secondary labor market. Advanced capitalism also required a continual flow of low-wage, relatively unskilled immigrant laborers to fill undesirable jobs (Burawoy 1976; Sassen-Koob 1978; Piore 1979) . Due to barriers to mobility between the secondary and primary labor markets, immigrant-minority groups become trapped in a succession of low-wage and unstable jobs (Bluestone 1970; Doeringer and Piore 1971) . The assumption of eventual assimilation may not extend to some immigrantminority groups.
A separate but related set of structural theories emphasizes the salience of ethnic solidarity in explaining the socioeconomic attainment of some racial and ethnic minorities despite persistent discrimination. Ethnic solidarity theorists focus on the institutions and social dynamics that facilitate the mobilization of ethnic resources for economic advancement. In explaining the high participation in small business of Chinese and Japanese immigrants, Light (1972) argues that a cultural proclivity towards business partnerships and the institution of rotating credit unions enabled Chinese and Japanese immigrants to start up small businesses. Some scholars (Siu 1952; Bonacich 1973) contend that the sojourning pattern of migration of some immigrant groups gives rise to an orientation that encourages reactive solidarity and economic activity associated with "middlemen minorities." In a case study of the Japanese-American community before World War II, Bonacich and Modell (1980) point to interactions between ethnic solidarity, small business concentration, and societal hostility that facilitated the mobilization of ethnic resources for economic action. Ethnic-solidarity theorists share an emphasis on ethnic resources to explain why some immigrant-minority groups achieve economic success despite societal hostility and initial disadvantages.
Building on both the segmented-labor-market and ethnic-solidarity theories, Alejandro Portes and his colleagues (Portes et al. hereafter) have strongly challenged assimilation theory, particularly the ecological hypothesis. Portes et al. (e.g., Portes, Clark, and Bach 1977; Bach 1980; Portes and Bach 1980, 1985; Portes, Parker, and Cobas 1980; Bach, Bach, and Triplett 1981; Portes 1981 Portes , 1982 Portes , 1984 Portes, Clark, and Lopez 1982; contend that some immigrant-minority groups avoid the harsh consequences of incorporation into the secondary labor market through the establishment of immigrant-enclave economies. Wilson and Portes (1980, p. 302) formalized this argument in the enclave-economy hypothesis, which they claim "directly contradicts conventional predictions:" Immigrant workers are not restricted to the secondary labor market. In particular, those inserted into an immigrant enclave can be empirically distinguished from workers in both the primary and secondary labor markets. Enclave workers will share with those in the primary sector a significant economic return to past human capital investments.
Such a return will be absent among those in the "open" secondary labor market. Portes (1981, p. 291) What renders the enclave economy hypothesis a critical challenge to the ecological hypothesis of the assimilation school is the proposition that, despite the social isolation of the enclave, there is no cost to segregation. Enclave workers, in contrast to workers in the secondary labor market, gain similar returns on human capital investments as workers in the primary labor market. The enclave-economy hypothesis advances a " separate but equal" proposition, which, if true, undermines a major tenet of assimilation theory.
According to the proponents of the enclaveeconomy hypothesis, immigrant entrepreneurs mobilize ethnic solidarity to establish a "unified system of vertical and horizontal integration," enabling enclave firms to replicate some of the economies of scale associated with core monop-LIMITS OF ETHNIC SOLIDARITY 747 olistic firms. Hence, "the enclave resembles the center economy and should have many of the advantages which that form of economy enjoys" (Wilson and Martin, 1982, p. 138) . Moreover, ethnic solidarity "serves to provide entrepreneurs with privileged access to immigrant labor and to legitimize paternalistic work arrangements" (Portes, 1981, p. 291) , giving enclave firms favorable work discipline, and rendering them less vulnerable to unionization. Ethnic networks can also be drawn upon to generate informal sources of capital formation and captive markets, making enclave firms more self-sufficient and resilient. These factors also make the prospect of starting up firms more open to aspiring entrepreneurs. Enclaveeconomy proponents argue that ethnic solidarity involves "reciprocal obligations," which explain why enclave workers experience returns on human capital investment similar to workers in the primary labor market.
If employers can profit from the willing self-exploitation of fellow immigrants, they are also obliged to reserve for them those
supervisory positions that open in their firms, to train them in trade skills, and to support their eventual move into self-employment. It is the fact that enclave firms are compelled to rely on ethnic solidarity and that the latter "cuts both ways," which creates opportunities for mobility unavailable in the outside" (Portes and Bach, 1985, p. 343 (Blalock 1956 (Blalock , 1957 Duncan and Lieberson 1959; Lieberson 1963; Frisbee and Neidert 1977; Parcel 1979) . Empirical examinations of the enclaveeconomy hypothesis Portes 1982; Considerable evidence suggests that immigrants both in and out of ethnic-enclave economies who operate small businesses fare substantially better in social and economic experiences than immigrants employed in the private sector (Bonacich, Light, and Wong 1977; Bonacich and Modell 1980; Kim 1981; Cobas 1985; Nee and Sanders 1985) .
Portes et al. recognize that self-employed Cuban immigrants in Miami have several advantages over Cuban immigrants in the private sector of the enclave economy. For example, Portes and Bach (1980) report that employment in the Cuban enclave is directly associated with greater than a $100-per-month earnings-disadvantage. This is substantial; Cubans averaged only $647. In Latin Journey, report significant differences between workers and bosses in the Cuban enclave (pp. 205-16), but they inexplicably ignore such differences when estimating returns to human capital. Because a discriminant analysis conducted on the sample as of 1979 indicates that the number of employees in a firm discriminates between labor markets even when self-employed Cubans are omitted, may have felt justified in ignoring boss-worker comparisons when specifying their earnings equation. But the practice of not controlling for self-employment originated in an earlier study Our second concern is that the earning-returns of recent immigrants who participate in the enclave economy are compared only to Cuban immigrant-workers in the Miami enclave who are defined as not participating in the Cuban controlled economy. This is a severely limited view of the "open" economy. Such a comparison is not a legitimate test of the fundamental ideas of the segmented-labor-market literature or assimilation theory. The research of Lieberson (1963) , Piore (1979) , and Bonacich and Modell (1980) suggests that ethnic-enclave workers may commonly receive lower rates of returns to human capital than ethnic workers who participate in the "outside" labor market. Though it is often the offspring of immigrants who first enter the mainstream economy on a large scale, the benefits of such employment are not restricted to U.S.-born ethnics.
In light of these concerns, the evidence in support of the hypothesis that immigrantworkers in an enclave economy are protected from the disadvantages associated with the "open" secondary labor market is inconclusive. It might be that immigrant-workers in ethnicenclave settings do achieve approximately the same earning-returns to past human capital investments as immigrant-workers outside the enclave economy, but the research of Portes et al. is unable to demonstrate this. The two questions we have raised must be answered before we can feel confident that the ethnicenclave hypothesis is supported. Both questions may be answered empirically.
EXAMINING THE MERITS OF THE ENCLAVE ECONOMY HYPOTHESIS
To test the enclave-economy hypothesis, we focus on the Cuban enclave in the Florida cities of Miami and Hialeah and on the Chinese enclave in San Francisco, California. Our study is a comparative examination involving two immigrant-minority groups. Given the arguments behind the enclave-economy hypothesis, we consider the usefulness of human-capital theory, the segmented-labor-market literature, and assimilation theory in helping us understand how contemporary immigrants to the U. Becker and Chiswick (1966) and modified by Mincer (1974) , appears to be superior to alternative specifications used by economists and sociologists alike (Heckman and Polachek 1974; Petersen 1985a) . Chiswick (1977a Chiswick ( , 1977b Chiswick ( , 1978 Chiswick ( , 1980 has made extensive use of the model in studying immigrants.
In 1980, Miami and Hialeah had a combined population of just under 500,000, approximately 50 percent of which was Cuban. While the Cuban business community is active throughout Dade county and beyond, Cuban enterprise, employment, place of residence, and cultural events are most concentrated in Miami and Hialeah. Boswell and Curtis (1984, Chapter 5) describe the Cuban community in South Florida. San Francisco's population in 1980 was almost 680,000, 12 percent of which was Chinese. Table 1 provides data on Cuban-owned businesses in the Miami SMSA and Chinese-owned businesses in the San Francisco-Oakland SMSA.
In 1977, mean receipts for Cuban firms were $85,000 compared to $92,000 for Chinese firms. Though manufacturing firms tended to employ the most workers per firm in both the Cuban and Chinese enclave economies, the proportion of total receipts accounted for by various industries differed considerably between the two enclaves. Manufacturing accounted for the largest share (30 percent) of receipts among Cuban firms, while retailing accounted for 61 percent of all receipts among Chinese firms. The retail and service categories alone accounted for 75 percent of the total receipts of Chinese firms. Common to both enclave economies are the large numbers of garment shops (which tend to be heavy employers of women), retail shops, (Chen 1980) . Growth in the Cuban enclave has to a greater extent been generated through internal capital formation (Boswell and Curtis 1984; To be sure, there is a considerable degree of self-selection involved in who resides where. For example, the Cuban enclave offers Cuban immigrants with poor English-language skills a place where they can more easily communicate with others and feel at ease. If these types of self-selection processes are important predictors of earnings, and if their influences are not adequately taken into account by the variables we control for, such as English skills, U.S. citizenship, and time of immigration, the model we examine is misspecified and our findings may be misleading. One variable in particular may be problematic. The place of residence of an immigrant is likely to be influenced by the geographical location of relatives. A potential difficulty arises because kinship ties may affect earnings net of place of residence and the other variables considered in our model. It is possible that immigrants who reside near relatives may systematically receive a boost in earnings because of assistance received from family members (or they may systematically experience reduced earnings due to family obligations). However, it is conceivable that once place of residence and human-capital characteristics such as English-language skills and education are controlled for, the hypothetical direct relationship between kinship ties and earnings is effectively mediated. If this is the case, the parameter estimates obtained from the equations we report are not biased by our inability to specify kinship ties.
The issue of self-selection can be conceived of as a problem of sample selection bias insofar as place of residence is partially determined by a process in which people are distributed across geographical areas in a nonrandom way. If one has an adequate theory of the selection process and available data to estimate the unknown parameters of that theory, methods suggested by Heckman (1976 Heckman ( , 1979 may be used to reduce the gravity of biasness in the parameter estimates of the substantive model that is likely to exist if the substantive model is indeed misspecified (e.g., a selection process is operating, but the substantive model does not take into account how this process affects the dependent 2 In order to be comparable to Portes et al., our samples are restricted to men. We are moving toward the study of families rather than individuals, but such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
3 Self-employment is defined as code (5) 7 It is widely recognized that underreports of earnings are common among the self-employed. If underreporting is consistent within ethnic groups (e.g., well educated Cuban entrepreneurs underreport their dollar-earnings as much (percentage-wise) as poorly educated Cuban entrepreneurs), the parameter estimates (including the intercept) and the t-statistics will be unaffected. If underreporting varies between ethnic groups (e.g., non-Hispanic white entrepreneurs underreport to a greater extent than Cuban entrepreneurs), the parameter estimates and the t-statistics will still be unaffected, as long as within-group underreporting is done consistently. In order to de-emphasize immigrants who might be viewed as only occasional workers, the samples we examine are restricted to men who worked the equivalent of four weeks on a full-time basis (160 hours) and who earned at least $500. This means that our analyses are conducted on truncated samples. Though the proportion of cases omitted due to the minimum requirements of work-time and earnings is small (the range is from 1.25 to 4.37 percent in the 12 subsamples analyzed), in principle, it is still possible that the accuracy of our results is compromised (see Berk 1983) . In this case, we believe that we can specify and estimate a model that effectively allows us to integrate the selection process into our substantive model. In empirical terms, we need to estimate an equation that provides a good prediction of which immigrants earned at least $500 and worked at last 160 hours in 1979. The dependent variable of the selection model is a dummy variable coded 0 for those who failed to work or earn these required minimums. The exogenous variables include a dummy variable indicating whether a language other than English is spoken in the home; a dummy variable that indicates whether respondents have attended at least four years of high school; age; the approximate number of years that immigrants have resided in the U.S. (possible values include 2, 7, 12, 17, 25, and 35-greater accuracy is not possible using the PUMS data); the interaction of age and years since immigration; and a dummy variable that distinguishes managers, administrators, executives, professionals, and technicians from other members of the labor force.
The selection equation accounts for more than one-third of the variance in the dichotomous dependent variable in each of the 12 subsamples. The procedure we follow is to construct a hazard rate using the predicted Ys obtained from a probit analysis of the selection equation (see Heckman 1976 Heckman , 1979 Berk 1983 ). The hazard rate is then added as an exogenous variable to the substantive model. Because very few parameter estimates or tests of statistical significance differ between specifications of the substantive model with and without the hazard rate included, we report results obtained from the more parsimonious specifications (i.e., equations estimated without the hazard rate). However, all estimates that differ in statistical significance across the two specifications are distinguished in the tables that follow. In each of these cases, both of the parameter estimates (and their t-ratios) are reported. The direct effect of the hazard rate is statistically significant in only 1 of the 12 substantive equations; this too is reported in the appropriate table.
Findings Table 2 provides descriptive data on the three subsamples of employees in Florida. The most striking observation is the disadvantaged character of Cuban immigrants in Miami and Hialeah compared to Cuban immigrants living elsewhere in Florida. Further, Cuban and non-Hispanic white immigrants living outside of Miami and Hialeah are quite similar. On average, Cubans in the enclave areas earned only about 70 percent as much in wages and salaries as the other groups. Several of the other differences shown in Table 2 may account for the disadvantage in earnings. For example, college education is substantially less common among Cubans in Miami and Hialeah, English-language skills are poorest among this group, and U.S. citizenship is less common. Combined, these variables suggest that enclave dwellers are culturally less assimilated than Cubans who live outside of Miami and Hialeah. This impression is supported by the fact that more recent cohorts of Cuban immigrants tend to be overrepresented in Miami and Hialeah. The occupational distributions of the two Cuban subsamples are more differentiated, as indicated by the index of dissimilarity, than are the occupational distributions of the Cuban and non-Hispanic white subsamples living outside of Miami and Hialeah.
In Table 3 , the three-group comparison is 9 See Blalock (1984) for a review of important issues pertaining to contextual analysis.
10 Our model takes into account 11 occupational categories for employees and 6 occupational categories among the self-employed. In the latter case, some categories have been pooled due to an infrequency of cases. Occupations of the self-employed tend to cluster more than employee-occupations. Consequently, the occupational categories of the self-employed and private sector employees are not always comparable. We do not specify a segmented labor market. The extent to which theoretical sectors (e.g., primary and secondary) partition the entire labor market in sufficiently distinctive forms that they can be accurately specified in structural equations is unclear (Cain 1976; Smith 1983 Table 4 demonstrate that such a strategy is unwarranted, given our data and model. Equation 1 in Table 4 The second question we raised is whether
Cuban immigrants in the ethnic enclave typically receive earning-returns to human-capital characteristics on a par with Cuban immigrants living elsewhere in Florida. In Table 4 Portes and Bach 1985, p. 171 , Table   46 ) who are employed in the private sector to be in the secondary labor market. This estimate is based on information provided by Portes and Bach (1985, p. 216-18) We now consider these analyses in detail. In Table 5 12 The "plateau" of this curve is obtained by dividing the parameter estimate of labor-market experience by twice the parameter estimate of labor-market experience squared (see note f in Table 5 ). A different story emerges from Table 6 . Self-employed Cuban immigrants in Miami and Hialeah typically receive equal returns to human capital compared to either Cuban or nonHispanic white immigrants in the outside economy. There are some differences; for instance, self-employed Cuban immigrants in Miami and Hialeah receive comparatively less return to labor-market experience, but they appear to benefit most from the acquisition of English-language skills. Overall, the differences in parameter estimates across equations 2 and 3 in Table 6 are minimal (F = .53, 19 and 1,060 d.f., p > .05). Self-employment in Miami and Hialeah appears to provide an avenue through which immigrants participating in the Cuban enclave economy can achieve comparable returns to their human-capital characteristics. 17
To this point, our examination suggests that the enclave-economy hypothesis has merit when limited to the self-employed, but is soundly rejected in the case of private-sector employees. We now attempt to discover whether these findings can be replicated and shown to be generalizable beyond the Cuban case. (Chiswick 1978 (Chiswick , 1980 17 Strictly speaking, these findings do not represent empirical evidence in support of the enclave-economy hypothesis. About all that can be said is that our results are consistent with the enclave-economy hypothesis when it is restricted to only self-employed Cuban immigrants. Hodson and Kaufman (1982, p. 733 ) note this problem in works that use segmented structures in the economy as the null hypothesis and thereby put the burden of proof on evidence that would lead us to reject the existence of a segmented structure. The burden of proof must be placed on evidence that would lead us to accept a segmented structure before the claim can be made that the existence of a hypothetical segmented structure has been demonstrated through an empirical test. cYears of labor-market experience at which earnings reach a plateau. (ns = non-significant). dVariable is omitted. In equation 1, Ethnic has no variance. In equation 3, Ethnic is unwarranted on theoretical grounds. eThe decimal point of the parameter estimate is moved 2 places to the right. f When the selection hazard rate is controlled for B = .022 and the t-ratio = 1.402. 9 When the selection hazard rate is controlled for, B = -.056 and the t-ratio= -1.811. hOutside of Miami and Hialeah.
A similar picture emerges from Table 8 .
Self-employed Chinese immigrants in San
Francisco appear to be disadvantaged in compar- 1975-1979 .314 .303 .159 % immigrating 1970-1974 .200 .228 .100 % immigrating 1965-1969 .209 .212 .122 % immigrating 1960-1964 .062 .091 .170 % immigrating 1950-1959 1975-1979 .192 .218 .129 % immigrating 1970-1974 .128 .228 .090 % immigrating 1965-1969 .244 .175 .115 % immigrating 1960-1964 .064 .089 .160 % immigrating 1950-1959 .103 in an ethnic-enclave economy can lead to returns to human capital that equal those received by immigrants in the outside economy.
We examine these results more closely in Table 7 ), this estimate translates into a $700 return per year of college education. The approximate average value of a college degree is around $2,800 in annual earnings. These findings are consistent with those obtained from the Florida samples. Among the immigrant groups, workers employed in the private sector who live in areas characterized by a well-developed enclave economy typically receive lower returns to human-capital characteristics than do their immigrant group counterparts who live in nonenclave areas. Table   9 ). Further, a comparison of equations 2 and 3 in Table 11 economy in which immigrant-workers in an enclave economy "share with those in the primary sector a significant economic return to past human-capital investments" (Wilson and Portes 1980, p. 302) . In confounding immigrant businessmen with paid employees, Portes et al. fail to recognize a distinction in returns to human capital between bosses and workers. The enclave-economy hypothesis must be revised to focus on the advantages of ethnic entrepreneurs in enclave economies:
While immigrant-minority workers in the open economy tend to receive higher returns to human capital than immigrant-minority workers in an ethnic-enclave economy, immigrant-minority entrepreneurs in an ethnic- cYears of labor-market experience at which earnings reach a plateau. (ns = non-significant).
dVariable is omitted. In equation 1, Ethnic has no variance. In equation 3, Ethnic is unwarranted on theoretical grounds. eVariable is omitted in equation 1 because there are no cases (see Table 6 ).
f The decimal point of the parameter estimate is moved two places to the right. 9 When the selection hazard rate is controlled for, B = -. 141 and the t-ratio = -1.860.
hWhen the selection hazard rate is controlled for, B = -.034 and the t-ratio = -.968.
'This is the only equation in which the direct association between logged earnings and the selection hazard rate is statistically significant (B = .124, t-ratio = 3.238). According to proponents of the enclaveeconomy hypothesis, a major advantage of enclave employment is that immigrants gain entry into an ethnic network that assists workers in starting up their own businesses. But as The ethnic-solidarity school has also failed to adequately take into account the extent to which ethnic enclaves are rife with competition and factionalism. Ethnographic accounts of ethnic enclaves provide ample evidence of intense competition and factionalism that render ethnicbased collective action problematic (Whyte 1943; Gans 1962; Suttles 1968; . Factionalism is reflected in conflicts between rival youth gangs, secret societies, and ethnic-based political organizations. The highly publicized case of the Chung Pak housing project in New York City's Chinatown represents an example of how such rivalry can hurt the quality of life in ethnic enclaves. Here the influence of ethnic divisions threatened to undermine a badly needed apartment building for senior citizens (see The New York Times, July 20, 1986, p. 18) . In divided ethnic enclaves with a history of subordination, the perception of zero-sum competition heightens the problem of collective action. Collective economic action is highly problematic even when strong rational interests are involved, due to the "free rider" dilemma (Olson 1965) . When ethnic solidarity is mobilized, it is typically in reaction to interethnic competition (Hannan, 1979) . Such instances of ethnic collective action are usually temporary and difficult to channel into economic action that benefits the enclave as a whole.
In Economy and Society, Weber ([1922 Weber ([ ] 1978 characterized the high degree of solidarity of the family unit as "household communism," in which family bonds generate "solidarity in dealing with the outside and communism of property and consumption of everyday goods within." Due to this quality, the family unit comprises a strategic resource in immigrant adaptation that is often neglected in current studies of immigrant incorporation. Both the qualities of solidarity and communism become valuable social capital in facing the uncertainties and challenges of adaptation to a new society. The strength of family bonds may also allow kinship ties to be used for economic adaptation. Particularly in the case of immigrants who initiate small businesses, the family household provides essential unpaid labor for thinly capitalized businesses to start up and compete. In cases where immigrants enter into wage labor, household communism may likewise provide the basis for family strategies that require individual sacrifices. It may be that reliance on the family household for economic action intensifies the solidarity of the family unit. Research on immigration needs to incorporate an emphasis on family solidarity and household strategies to gain a better understanding of the mix of resources-ethnic, class, and family-that immigrants draw on in their adaptation and of the consequences these resources have on their subsequent socioeconomic attainment.
In an earlier paper, we point to the importance of distinguishing between the cost of ethnicity and the cost of immigration (Nee and Sanders 1985) . Previous studies frequently compound these costs, so that the expected socioeconomic dislocations associated with immigration are inadvertently attributed to the cost of ethnicity. It is equally important to distinguish between the cost of immigration and the cost of segregation. There is need for a systematic study of the cost of segregation that works independently of ethnicity and immigration to gain a more accurate understanding of the processes through which contemporary immigrant groups become accommodated to U.S. society.
Though we have not directly tested Park and
Burgess' theory, many of our findings are consistent with assimilationist arguments and demonstrate the continuing relevance of this perspective. Both private-sector employees and self-employed Cuban and Chinese immigrants living outside of the ethnic enclave have higher socioeconomic status and are more similar in their educational and occupational characteristics to non-Hispanic white immigrants than are immigrants living in enclave areas. Moreover, immigrant-workers in the open labor market appear to gain higher returns to human capital than immigrant-workers of similar qualifications in the ethnic enclave. These findings conform to assimilation theory in that (1) an inverse relationship exists between immigrants' socioeconomic achievement and their spatial concentration in ethnic enclaves; and (2) lower levels 18 Granovetter (1985) provides an excellent discussion of why it is important for researchers to be sensitive to the symbiosis between economic behavior (such as the operation of a business) and the interpersonal relationships among actors (e.g., bosses, employees) who take part in the behavior.
19 In their recent study of post-1980 Cuban and Haitian immigrants, write that they The third problem is, however, the most serious and, in our view, the one which invalidates Sanders and Nee's results as a test of this hypothesis. The problem is confounding participation in an enclave economy with living in an ethnic neighborhood. In its popular usage, the word "enclave" does evoke the image of residential concentration, but nowhere in our past writings has it been used in this manner. There are actually several passages which warn explicitly against this confusion:
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Finally, we must also distinguish enclaves from immigrant neighborhoods. Most immigrant groups initially resettle in ethnically concentrated communities and generate a few small businesses to serve immediate, specialized consumption needs. Ethnic neighborhoods fulfill important social support functions, but lack the extensive division of labor of the enclave and, especially, its highly differentiated entrepreneurial class (Portes and Bach 1985, pp. 204-5 An example is provided by a large firm, studied recently, and which we will call Inter-America Transport. It produces and exports sugar-harvesting equipment and other agricultural machinery to Latin America and elsewhere. The firm's offices and plant are is similar to those found in Sanders and Nee's tables 2 and 3 with several differences. Sanders and Nee extend their analysis to the process of income attainment, contending that enclave participation reduces the expected payoff for individual human capital among minority employees. Again their operationalization of enclave membership is erroneously based on place of residence. We have also followed them there and replicated their analysis among (1) the full sample; (2) Cuban residents of the enclave area, defined as above; and (3) Cuban workers in this area. The analysis was conducted separately for the self-employed and for employees. Results for the latter represent the main point of contention. They will be summarized by noting that the pattern of effects of predictor variables on logged earnings does not register a single significant difference between the full sample and the sample of enclave workers.
Adding a dummy variable representing enclave place of work to the set of human-capital predictors in the full employee sample increases explained variance by less than one-half of one percent. The same result obtains when adding the interactions of place of work with each human-capital predictor to the additive equation.
Thus, our analysis of the PUMS data indicate that Cubans who work in the prime area of ethnic-business concentration in the cities of Miami and Hialeah are not penalized economically, whether they are employees or entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the population living in the low-income housing in the vicinity of this business enclave is composed, to a large extent, of the lesser educated and more recent refugees. Their economic disadvantages are confirmed by our analysis, but are not particularly surprising.
The original research that gave rise to the concept of the enclave was not based on an analysis of secondary data, but on extensive fieldwork. It was this experience that drove home the difference between mere residential concentration and the social networks on which a growing ethnic economy was based. The dispersal of the Cuban population away from the areas of original concentration in the wake of economic success is apparent even to the casual observer. Thus, referring to other Latin American immigrants, a recent report on Miami notes "At first, these immigrants lived in Miami proper, in sections of Little Havana that had been vacated by prosperous Cuban-Americans. . . . Cuban-Americans remained attached to Little Havana, at least as a business center, . the progressively shabbier apartment complexes around the Orange Bowl were becoming the territory of those Cubans without money, the marielitos" (Rieff 1987, p. 68) .
In the absence of first-hand field research, we are unwilling to define limits of the Chinese ethnic economy of San Francisco on the basis of secondary data, as done by Sanders and Nee. However, we have analyzed the available PUMS data following their definition of "enclave. " Space constraints prevent presenting these results, which are available from the authors on request. We will simply summarize them by saying that they reproduce, in all the essentials, the pattern reported for Cubans above.
What Sanders and Nee have done is to compare low-income central city immigrant neighborhoods with the more affluent members of the same groups living in suburban areas or elsewhere in the state. Results of such analysis are not surprising. If they wish to call certain residential areas "enclaves," that is their privilege, but this definition has little to do with the phenomenon that we have attempted to describe in past writings. Enclaves do not emerge merely by residential concentration-a pattern common to all immigrant groups-but by the exceptional rise of a number of integrated ethnic firms within a metropolitan area that provide employment for a sizable proportion of workers from the same minority. The phenome- Portes and Jensen downplay our findings that the purported benefits of participating in an immigrant enclave economy apply only to ethnic entrepreneurs. Contrary to the enclave economy hypothesis, we find that ethnic workers in the enclave receive comparatively low returns to their human capital investments.
According to Portes and Jensen, such findings are anticipated by the enclave economy hypothesis. We fail to see evidence of this. The hypothesis itself makes no distinction between workers and bosses. and are cited to support the contention that the enclave-economy hypothesis has led researchers to investigate and document differences in earning-returns for workers and entrepreneurs. In fact, neither study examines the possibility that such returns differ for workers and bosses. As our article points out, Table 74 of Portes and Bach (1985, pp. 234-35) include a multivariate analysis of 99 workers in the secondary labor market. The analysis of enclave "workers" is conducted on a pooled sample of 75 entrepreneurs and 105 employees. Why 99 cases are sufficient for multivariate analyses and 75 cases are not escapes our understanding. The study shows that the Cuban enclave is important in accounting for why recent Cuban refugees from Mariel have been better able to avoid unemployment and informal employment than recent Haitian refugees. While informative, this finding has no direct relevance for our critique of the enclave-economy hypothesis.
Two additional points must be mentioned.
First, Portes and Jensen claim that the enclave economy hypothesis does not contain a "separate but equal" argument. We take strong issue with this disavowal. The hypothesis states, in part, "Enclave workers will share with those in the primary sector a significant economic return to past human capital investments. Such a return will be absent among those in the open secondary labor market" (see Wilson and Portes 1980, p. 302) . Portes et al. emphasize that the enclave economy offers Cuban immigrant workers a protected niche where they can avoid the costs of employment in the secondary labor market and instead receive returns to their human capital commensurate with employment in the primary labor market. According to Portes et al., immigrants within the enclave economy can carry out their work and leisure activities without having to know the language of their host country and without extensive interactions outside their own ethnic group. For this reason, they maintain that the enclave economy hypothesis "directly contradicts conventional predictions" derived from assimilation theory (Wilson and Portes 1980, p. 302) . This is the main theme of numerous papers and it is an important component of the analyses and interpretations in Latin Journey (1985) . The "separate but equal" argument is central to Portes et al. It seems to us that Portes is now stepping away from this position; we think it is a move in the right direction. The published literature makes it possible for readers to draw their own conclusions.
Second, Portes and Jensen suggest that we made errors of interpretation because our analyses are based wholly on secondary data. This criticism seems surprising in light of the ethnographic field research conducted by in San Francisco's Chinatown. The boundaries of the Chinese enclave delineated in include a core enclave area and new satellites in San Francisco.
Work and residence are closely intertwined, especially for enclave workers. The results of this research suggest that, far from being a protected niche, the ethnic enclave labor market should be regarded as an extension of the competitive secondary labor market. Discussions of the findings from the San Francisco field study stimulated our interest in conducting a systematic comparative test of the enclaveeconomy hypothesis. While Portes et al. suggest that ethnic solidarity between boss and worker, over the long run, provides immigrant workers with conditions of work that replicate the primary labor market, the ethnographic study revealed a different reality, one in which competitive pressures in the enclave labor market drive down wages to levels even lower than the outside secondary labor market. Ethnic solidarity was used by enclave employers to insulate immigrant workers from union organizers and to perpetuate and reproduce a pliant low-wage immigrant work force, not to help workers to enter into self-employment (see Nee and Nee 1986, pp. 278-319) .
In light of the strong case for fieldwork made by Portes and Jensen, we are perplexed by the absence of field observations in the text of the published writings of Portes et al. that might support their assertion that a social mechanism, based on reciprocity, operates in which bosses assist workers in their quest for upward socioeconomic mobility. Instead, their discussion of ethnic solidarity between bosses and workers appears to be largely speculative, based on plausible inferences and not on findings from field research. There is repeated mention of reciprocity and networks of cooperation in Portes et al., but no concrete data or examples to support the assertions of ethnic solidarity. We agree wholeheartedly with Portes and Jensen on the importance of fieldwork, yet remain puzzled by their criticism of our work on this point.
Portes et al., through their various writings on Hispanic immigration, have contributed some of the most imaginative and provocative work on current immigration to the United States. Our interest in testing the enclave economy hypothesis reflects our appreciation of the significance of their work. That our analyses show that the hypothesis is not supported in the case of immigrant employees should be seen as affirming the view of sociology as a science that marks its progress by the successive testing of theoretical hypotheses, not as a denial of the contribution of the enclave economy school to sociological thought.
